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Retrospective Changes to Small Business Concessions

 My last rant measured expression of my opinion was only one small voice amongst many people criticising the Federal Opposition attach on franking credit refunds. Now it is time to show I have no political bias and turn the same criticism on the Federal Government for their proposed small business changes, which are arguably far worse, particular for individual small business owners who have just sold their business, or are about to do so.


Every so often something arises that has a less obvious impact but potentially poses far greater damage for individuals. That is currently demonstrated as the proposed changes to small business concessions which were announced in February.


The issue is that for a number of years various generous concessions for selling small businesses have been available as compensation for business owners not having been able to save for their retirement. To qualify (and this is grossly over-simplifying) they must have net assets of less than $6mil or turnover under $2mil.


In May 2017 the govt announced it would be cracking down on aggressive strategies with an integrity measure to ensure the small business concessions were appropriately applied. However, the February 2018 draft legislation proposed retrospective measures that went far beyond the scope of the previous announcement. These issues will affect future and past business sales in ways no ever realised and we sincerely hope it won’t become legislation. The restrospectivity of these changes means that they operate for businesses that were sold after 1 July 2017 – some 9 months before the legislation was drafted.


The proposed legislation includes 4 new criteria to be satisfied, the draft legislation repeals s 152-10(2) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (the ITAA 1997). In substitution, it inserts a new s 152-10(2). The conditions of the new subsection are:

 

  1. a stricter active asset test
  2. if a taxpayer relies on the CGT small business entity test to qualify for the SB concessions, they must be carrying on a business just before the relevant CGT event
  3. the company or trust in which the shares or units are being sold (the object entity) must be carrying on a business just before the CGT event, and
  4. the object entity must itself either satisfy the CGT small business entity test or a modified $6m maximum net asset value test.


Whilst some of the changes are sensible, such as preventing a person from using the small business concessions to shield a capital gain on shares or units by becoming a CGT small business entity (ie by starting a new, unrelated business) later in that income year. Others are very concerning, in particular the changes that will have retrospective application to periods prior to 1 July 2017, by virtue of the application of the modified active asset test (which looks back at the history of ownership of the relevant shares or units).


In circumstances where the ATO can, and has, applied Part IVA to the real mischief that this proposed legislation targets, it really is unclear why it was needed, and why it went so far, and why it applies retrospectively.


Both Vincees of Government must do better than this. It leads to far too much uncertainty and a serious lack of confidence.

 


 

Posted in: Tax & ATO News Australia at 20 March 18

Franking Credit Proposed Changes

Politicians just cannot help mucking around with tax laws. I am not the first person to talk about this, and right now I am obviously not the only person, as the Federal Opposition’s latest thought bubble on refunding franking credits is roundly and rightly criticised.


In the interests of fairness and balance, I want to talk about another ill-thought out and retrospective proposed change which the current Federal Government is planning to make to small business concessions. But before I do that, just one quick comment in relation to the Opposition’s franking credit problem that I have not seen anyone make. Bear with me – this is a bit mathsy:


The Opposition’s proposal is that the government will stop drawing cheques to people who receive franking credits in excess of their taxable income. Practically, as has dominated the press in recent days, this targets self funded retirees who received franked dividends from companies, but do not have large taxable incomes because they are receiving tax-free superannuation pensions. The theory apparently being, well hey, they are not going to vote ALP anyway. So far, so cynical. And to someone who doesn’t understand how franking credits work, it kind of makes sense: why should the Government be sending out cheques to all of these wealthy old people?


But here’s the rub – there is absolutely zero difference to the budget bottom line whether a rebate is represented by a payment from the government or a reduction in tax payable by a tax payer. In either case, this is money that government does not have.


To give you the example, take two people: Vince a self funded retiree with a self managed superannuation fund with $1,000,000 of Australian blue chip shares in it, and a Federal Politician with a randomly selected salary of $375,588 per annum and the same number of shares. We’ll call him Bill. Let’s ignore Bill’s perks and any other tax breaks – I have never acted for a Federal politician in a tax matter, and frankly I’m happy to keep it that way.


Vince receives fully franked dividends of $50,000 per annum. The way franking credits work is that is cash of $35,000 and franking credits of $15,000. Vince therefore has pension income of $50,000, from which he is exempt from tax. Under the current system the franking credits are refunded to him, so he gets $15,000 from the Federal Govt. This is what the Opposition wants to stop.


Bill on the otherhand is on the top marginal tax rate. He pays lots of tax – if you ignore his fully franked dividend of $50,000 (same as Vince’s) he pays $142,246.60 in tax (before medicare levy). But watch how Bill’s full franked dividend of $50,000 is treated. He gets the same amount of cash - $35,000. But as a result of the franking credit, his tax bill only increases to $149,746.60. If he didn’t get the franking credit, his tax would have been $164,746.60.


In other words, Bill gets the full use of the Franking Credit, because he pays $15,000 less tax than he otherwise would, whereas Vince misses out on the benefit completely. Put in reverse, the Federal coffers pick up $15,000 from Vince, the pensioner on $35k per annum, but don’t get the $15,000 from Bill, the politician on $275,746, after tax.

 

Not very fair is it?


My good intentions of providing balance must be sacrificed on the altar of brevity. I have already gone on too long. I will criticise the Government in Part 2.
 

Posted in: Tax & ATO News Australia at 19 March 18

Walsh and Commissioner of Taxation [2018] AATA 235

In the decision of Walsh v Commissioner of Taxation, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal examines an applicant for review by a taxpayer of a decision of the Commissioner not to revoke a Departure Prohibition Order issued. Deputy President Molloy ordered that the Departure Prohibition Order be revoked on the basis its continuation did not serve the intended purpose and intrusion imposed on the taxpayer outweighed the protection of revenue.

 

Following an audit of the taxpayer’s affairs conducted by the Australian Taxation Office, the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (‘DCT’) issued amended assessments and notices of assessments of administrative penalties for the financial years ended 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2008, on the basis that:

 

  • a sham arrangement existed between an Australian resident company and a company registered in Vanuatu, and monies transferred were the taxpayer’s assessable income; and
  • amounts credited in the loan account of the Australian resident company were deemed dividends and thus assessable income.


On 30 November 2010, the taxpayer objected to the assessment and on 10 August 2012 the Commissioner affirmed its decision. Accordingly, the taxpayer sought review of the decision on 9 October 2012, which was subsequently withdrawn and dismissed.


On 20 August 2015, the Commissioner issued a Departure Prohibition Order (‘DPO’) on the basis the taxpayer had a tax liability of $1,692,445.73, and that he failed to make an arrangement to pay his tax liability and there was a risk to revenue.


Subsequently, the DCT initiated proceedings in the Queensland Supreme Court to recover the tax liability and obtained a default judgement against the taxpayer.


On 2 December 2015, the taxpayer applied for revocation of the DPO, but the information provided by the taxpayer was not to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Taxation (‘Commissioner’) to allow the revocation.


On 4 January 2017, pursuant to debtor’s petition, trustees of the taxpayer’s bankrupt estate were appointed.
The taxpayer sought to have the Tribunal review the Commissioner’s decision not to revoke the DPO on the basis of three grounds.

 

The DPO was no longer lawful


It was contended by the taxpayer that pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act 1966 the taxpayer could not be subject to the DPO as a creditor cannot enforce any remedy against a bankrupt person in respect of a provable debt.


Conversely, the Commissioner contended the notion that no bankrupt who was at the time of the bankruptcy in debt to the Commissioner could ever be subject to a DPO had been rejected by the Federal Court in Edelsten v Federal Commissioner of Taxation.


Ultimately, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the DPO was rendered unlawful by virtue of the taxpayer’s bankruptcy.

 

Continuation of the DPO does not serve the purpose


The Tribunal observed that the central purpose of Part IVA of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (‘TAA’) is the prevention of persons with tax liability leaving Australia, where in the Commissioner’s belief reasonably arrived at, the recovery would or might thereby be impaired.


It was observed that the DPO had been in place for two years, over that time no contributions to revenue were made and the taxpayer did not have assets to pay the tax debt. Additionally, even if the DPO was set aside, the trustees would still control possession of the taxpayer’s passport and his ability to depart Australia.


In all the circumstances, the Tribunal was not satisfied the departure of the taxpayer from Australia would make it less likely that his tax liability will be discharged in either whole or part, or that the Commissioner’s ability to recover the tax would be impaired. Accordingly, the Tribunal found that the purpose of the legislation would not be met by the continuation of the DPO.

 

Freedom of movement


The Tribunal referred to Poletti v Commissioner of Taxation, where the Full Federal Court commented that the ‘severe intrusion’ of a DPO upon an individual’s ‘liberty, privacy and freedom of movement’ must be balanced against the protection of the revenue.


As the taxpayer’s principal place of resident was in the United States of America with his wife and young daughter, the Tribunal accepted the DPO operated as a particularly severe intrusion on his freedom of movement.


The Commissioner in relying on Troughton v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (‘Troughton’) submitted that the factors concerning the personal hardship on the taxpayer and his family do not justify the revocation, but a consideration relevant for a Departure Authorisation Certificate under s 14U TAA.


However, the Tribunal found the comments in Troughton were directed to the facts and circumstances of that case and not made with the intention of laying down any principle of general application.


The Tribunal noted that the discretion to under s 14T(2) TAA to revoke a DPO is wide in terms. Accordingly, the Tribunal found it unlikely that the legislative intention behind exercising that discretion would allow the decision maker to ignore the impact the continuation of the DPO would have on the taxpayer and his family.


On this basis, the Tribunal found that the taxpayer’s family circumstances would weigh heavily in favour and against the continuation of the DPO.

 

Co-authored with Ben Caratti
 

Posted in: Tax & ATO News Australia at 28 February 18

NZBG and Commissioner of Taxation (Taxation) [2017] AATA 2784

 The applicant, who currently lives in New Zealand, sought a review of the Commissioner’s refusal to a request for the release of a tax debt. The applicant tendered some written materials and made submissions by telephone at the hearing. The issues in review were whether the tax debt of $92,671.44 and general interest charge of $338,184.38 ought be released, in whole or in part, under s 340-10 of Schedule 1 to the Tax Administration Act 1953 (Cth).

 

The tribunal found that the applicant discharged his onus of proof. The tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant disclosed all of his assets and liabilities, asserting he had no assets other than monies in the bank, for which he failed to put current evidence. The tribunal was neither satisfied that the applicant had no other income besides his New Zealand pension. Statements by New Zealand residents that the applicant filed in relation to the Commissioner’s assertions of other possible assets and income sources were unable to be tested because those persons did not attend the hearing. For those reasons, the tribunal affirmed the Commissioner’s decision.
 

Posted in: Tax & ATO News Australia at 25 January 18

Tyl and Commissioner of Taxation (Taxation) [2017] AATA 2850

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed the Commissioner’s objection decision in relation to the taxpayer, Mr Damien Tyl. Mr Tyl was working as a truck driver in the 2012 and 2013 financial years when he claimed deduction for travel expenses, work-related expenses and car expenses. He was audited for those expenses resulting in the disallowance of the car expenses and reduction of all other deductions to nil. Mr Tyl objected to the results of the audit. In the objection decision, the Commissioner partly allowed deductions for all of the expenses. The administrative penalty was also reduced but not entirely remitted. Mr Tyl sought a review.
 

The Tribunal emphasised that the onus of proof in establishing his allowable deductions and that he has satisfied any substantiation requirements, as well as establishing that the administrative penalty should not have been made, was on Mr Tyl. Further, Mr Tyl is required to substantiate the whole claim if any expenditure exceeds the reasonable daily allowance allowed by the Commissioner which was $87 per day in the 2012 financial year and $89.60 per day in the 2013 financial year.
 

As noted by the Tribunal member throughout the review, Mr Tyl and his tax agent, Mr Fumberger, failed to provide good, if any, evidence in relation to several material assertions. They failed to present payslips, receipts, adequate bank statements or good evidence of travel allowance. A letter from Mr Tyl’s employer indicated that $50 per overnight trip was recorded on each weekly payslip. This evidence was inconsistent with Mr Tyl’s claim of actual travel expenditure and with his assertion as to the number of nights he spent away for both years, and showed that he exceeded the reasonable daily allowance in both years. He was thus required to substantiate the whole claim for each year with written evidence, which he failed to do.
 

The Tribunal thus affirmed the objection decision and found that the Commissioner was justified in issuing the administrative penalty because Mr Tyl and Mr Fumberger showed a lack of reasonable care.
 

Posted in: Tax & ATO News Australia at 24 January 18

VPRX and Commissioner of Taxation (Taxation) [2017] AATA 2156

The Applicant sold a website to a US buyer and received payment in instalments throughout the 2010 financial year, and further payments in the 2012 financial year. As the Applicant did not lodge a tax return for either year, the Commissioner issued default assessments with a 75% shortfall penalty based on amounts documented by AUSTRAC. The tax payable and penalties were reduced after the Applicant objected to the decision, and one payment was treated as capital.

The Applicant submitted that all of the documentation relating to the sale had been lost except for some emails. For the 2010 financial year payments, he contended that it was difficult to secure a fixed price during the GFC so the amounts received were ‘revenue payments’, consideration from the buyer based on their calculated profit, and were not income. He claims he was entitled to deductions for expenses in earning his ordinary income. With regard to the 2012 financial year payments, he contended that the penalty was unjust in circumstances where he was unable to locate the sale agreement. Indeed, the applicant was inefficient in producing evidence and failed to do so on several occasions.

The tribunal accepted the emails as evidence of a sale agreement but in the absence of its details, particularly the basis on which payments were calculated, treated the payments as income rather than capital. Regarding the penalty, the tribunal found that the Applicant’s inability to produce documents was no justification for concession and that, although he was not grossly careless, there was no justification for reducing the penalty in the circumstances. The tribunal reiterated that the onus is on the Applicant to establish that the assessments are excessive, and concluded that the Applicant was unable to discharge this burden. There were no submissions on the matter of capital gains tax.


 

Posted in: Tax & ATO News Australia at 28 November 17

Shord v Commissioner of Taxation

 The case is reasonably unremarkable for any legal or factual analysis, but it does provide a good insight into the attitude of the ATO towards acting as a uncompromising litigant, which makes the most of every possible procedural point, as opposed to a model litigant as they are required.

Justice Logan from Qld made some fantastic comments (with respect);

 

The standard of fair play expected of the Crown and its officers in litigation is a standard in keeping both with the avoidance of behaviours that, in an extreme form, led to the civil war and with the later constitutional settlement. Once this heritage is understood, the requirement for its observance is, or should be, as Griffith CJ stated, “elementary”.

 

I note that Robert Gottleibsen also discussed this case and raised these comments in yesterday’s Australian.

 

Shord v Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCAFC 167


Between 2006 and 2011, Mr Shord worked on various overseas assignments as a supervisor for foreign companies in the oil and gas industry. He did not lodge tax returns for that period, believing he was a non-resident. The Commissioner believed otherwise and issued amended assessments including all Mr Shord’s foreign income. The Commissioner disallowed Mr Shord’s objection.

The Tribunal found in favour of the Commissioner. The Tribunal found Mr Shord was a resident and, in particular, that his income was not exempt pursuant to s 23AG of the ITAA36. This provision exempts income of residents engaged in foreign services for a continuous period of not less than 91 days.

At the onset of the hearing, counsel for the Commissioner withdrew a contention that Mr Shord’s circumstances failed to meet the legislation’s definition of ‘foreign services’. The Tribunal nonetheless found that Mr Shord did not meet this definition. Fletcher v FCT is authority that a taxpayer is denied procedural fairness when a Tribunal makes a decision on the basis not argued by any party.

Procedural fairness was not raised on appeal to the Federal Court. Instead, the first two questions of law related to the proper application of s 23AG. These hinged on the third question which was whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide whether Mr Shord was engaged in ‘foreign services’. The fourth question was whether Mr Shord was entitled to offsets for foreign taxes paid. The primary judge found against Mr Shord on the third and fourth question and did not therefore consider the first two.

On appeal to the Full Federal Court, procedural fairness was finally raised by Mr Shord as the first ground in an amended notice of appeal. The Commissioner initially objected to the amendment but eventually conceded the ground to Mr Shord. The Full Court thus remitted the matter to the Federal Court to decide the two questions about s 23AG. Unlike the majority, Justice Logan reprimanded the Commissioner, as a representative of the Commonwealth, for its failure to act as a model litigant and raise the crucial issue earlier.

The second ground related to Mr Shord’s entitlement to tax offsets. The Full Court found that Mr Shord did not produce any evidence as to what, when and how much foreign tax he paid, and that neither the Tribunal nor the Commissioner had an obligation to help him adduce evidence to the contrary.
 

Posted in: Tax & ATO News Australia at 01 November 17

Unpacking The ALP's Proposed Trust Distributions Tax

Whatever you think about the fairness of the ALP’s proposed trust distributions tax [see link here] there is no doubt it creates a whole range of questions.

For fear of giving too much away in a (reasonably) public forum, I am not going to give the ATO and the potential future government a free kick by outlining in detail all of the gaps, overlaps and plain mistakes that are inherent in the ALP’s policy document. After all, it is only an outline at this stage, subject to ATO consultation. Who knows, they might get it all right.

But I doubt it.

What is clear, from their track record [see mining tax] is that a tax policy driven out of a perceived sense of public fairness is riven with the law of unintended consequence. It will inevitably create extensive planning opportunities for those accountants (and tax lawyers) that the ALP seem to dislike, and it will also create situations that are manifestly unfair in operation.

Both parties would do a lot better to dust off the Ralph Review and approach the taxation of entities comprehensively, rather than trying to snatch some cheap headlines to be seen to be doing something that the other side is not. That is no way to make tax policy.
 

Posted in: Tax & ATO News Australia at 17 August 17

In Pursuit of a Fairer System

 The Federal opposition seems to be searching hard for the glib soundbites. The latest attack is on expensive accountants, who only the uber-rich can afford, who use their superior accounting skills at high cost, to manipulate their clients’ affairs to pay no tax.


I came across a recent article in Accountants Daily which reported:


Last week, Bill Shorten delivered the opposition’s federal budget reply speech in which he proposed a cap on the amount individuals can claim as a tax deduction for the management of their tax affairs.


“In 2014-15, 48 Australians earned more than $1 million and paid no tax at all. Not even the Medicare levy. Instead, using clever tax lawyers, they deducted their income down from an average of nearly $2.5 million … to below the tax-free threshold,” Mr Shorten said.


“One of the biggest deductions claimed was the money they paid to their accountants, averaging over $1 million. That’s why a Labor government will cap the amount individuals can deduct for the management of their tax affairs at $3,000.”


The article goes on to make a point about “individuals potentially getting penalised for simply having to deal with a complex tax system and ever increasing requirements of the Tax Office”. I agree with this, and think that this policy is one of the most stupid ideas I have ever heard. Who advises these people?


I strongly doubt that anyone is paying north of $1m for annual tax advice, no matter how complex their tax affairs, or brilliant their advisor's advice.
What is much more likely is that these people have been involved in complex and aggressive audits, and have had to fight to prove their case against a huge team comprising the Commissioner of Taxation's in-house lawyers, external lawyers, junior barristers and silk.


Defending yourself in the face of this is incredibly expensive, particularly when you as a taxpayer bear the onus of proof. What most people don't realise is that barristers charge taxpayers a much higher rate than they charge the ATO. In circumstances where the ATO's audits are often little more than guesswork, debt recovery proceedings commence immediately, and the courts have continually maintained that the onus is on the taxpayer to prove their case and their correct tax position, then of course the cost of fighting the ATO is going to be huge.


To make this not tax deductible is simply ridiculous.


I will give you an example of how ridiculous and expensive audits can be: a few years ago, one of my colleagues was selected for audit. He had been doing alot of driving in a particular year, and the resultant (high) deduction triggered an audit. Fair enough. But the audit quickly blew into a full investigation of every item of income and expenditure this taxpayer had incurred. It took months. The accountant was of great assistance, and because absolutely everything was done correctly, the auditor eventually signed off without a single disallowance.


The accountant had done a huge amount of work and did it very well and efficiently. The bill was, none-the-less, eyewatering. My colleague paid happily in consideration of a job well done.


Guess what happened the following year? My colleague was again selected for an audit. Why? Because he had claimed so much the year before as a deduction for managing his tax affairs.


You would laugh if it wasn’t so frustrating.


Here's a better idea - limit the tax deduction for managing tax affairs by all means, but if the ATO starts an audit, provide the taxpayer a voucher for use on the accountant or lawyer of their choice, equivalent to the ATO's cost of the audit and any appeals (including external lawyers as well as the ATO wages and oncosts). In reality it should be much higher to factor in overheads and the Commissioner's disproportionate purchasing power, but even at only 100% of the ATO’s costs that will be a significantly higher figure than the corresponding deduction.


Or better yet, why don’t we limit the ATO budget for each auditto no more than $3,000, including overheads and a share of fixed costs.

Posted in: Tax & ATO News Australia at 23 May 17

Uber BV v The Commissioner of Taxation

Last Friday, the Federal Court held that services supplied under the uberX service constitute “taxi travel” within the meaning of s 144-5 (1) of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth).

 

To give context to this dispute, following the rise in popularity of the ride sharing platform the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) announced in 2015 that Uber drivers will have to register and pay GST, regardless of turnover. The general rule regarding registration is that an enterprise with a turnover of less than $75,000 is not required to register for GST. An exception to this rule is Section 144-5(1) which requires a person who is carrying on an enterprise of supplying ‘taxi travel’ to be registered for GST regardless of turnover. Section 195-1 of the GST Act goes on to define ‘taxi travel’ as ‘travel that involves transporting passenger, by taxi or limousine, for fares’.

 

The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) took the position that the Uber platform fell within this exception. However Uber disagreed with this position and sought a declaration from the Federal Court that the services provided by UberX drivers did not constitute taxi travel.

 

Applicant Submissions:


The applicant made submissions on the construction of ‘taxi travel’ claiming:

 

  • ‘Taxi Travel’ was intended to apply only to the taxi industry as the legislature did not seek to deal with this issue in any other industry.

  • The statutory context suggests that the words “taxi” and “limousine” bear a trade or non-legal meaning. Alternatively the ordinary meaning of the words “taxi” and “limousine” was heavily influenced by the underlying regulatory regime.
  • The disjunctive “taxi or limousine” in the definition of s195-1 provides that “taxi” and “limousine” have different meanings.

 

Using the above mentioned arguments on statutory construction, the applicant put forward factual arguments distinguishing Uber from Taxis. The applicant contended that Uber services did not display the essential operational features of a taxi, on the basis that Uber vehicles do not show markings, the access is limited to Uber licensees (App Users), payment systems and calculations differ and Uber drivers are not required to display a fare meter.

 

Respondent Submissions:


The respondent’s made submissions that:

 

  • “Taxi travel” is to be construed as a whole and connotes the transport, by a person driving a private vehicle, for a fare irrespective of whether the fare is calculated by reference to a taximeter.

  • The services supplied by Uber demonstrate the essential features of transport “by taxi” and “by limousine”.
  • The applicant incorrectly relied on the regulatory regimes applying to the taxi industry.

 

The Commissioner in support of its submission on the construction of ‘taxi travel’ used dictionary definitions to help identify the key features of a ‘taxi’ in ordinary understanding.

 

Furthermore the Commissioner made submissions that the difference between a limousine and a taxi was that a limousine is not calculated by reference to a taximeter and will need to be pre-booked. Therefore, “limousine” could apply to any hire car.

 

Decision:


Justice Griffiths “accepted the Commissioner’s submission that the word “taxi” is a vehicle available for hire by the public and which transports a passenger at his or her direction for the payment of a fare that will often, but not always, be calculated by reference to a taximeter”. In reaching this decision, consideration was placed on principles of statutory interpretation. Further to this the dictionary definitions the Commissioner relied upon provided the court with a supporting context of this interpretation.

 

However, Griffiths J rejected the Commissioner’s position that limousine was not confined to luxury cars. Instead the ordinary meaning of limousine “was a private luxurious motor vehicle which is made available for public hire and which transports a passenger at his or her direction for the payment of a fare”. Although the present matter involved a Honda Civic which did not meet this definition, Griffiths J recognised this position may be different in cases of other UberX drivers who do use luxury cars.


Ultimately this decision will impose huge compliance burdens on Uber and its drivers. Particularly Uber drivers will now have to register both an Australian Business Number and register for GST, charge an additional 10%, lodge Business Activity Statements and claim Input Tax Credits.

 

With this being another win for the Commissioner, it can be expected that there will be a crackdown in tax compliance within the ride sharing industry. 

Co-authored with Ben Caratti

Posted in: Tax & ATO News Australia at 09 March 17

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Author: David Hughes

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